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Abstract  The death of God, announced by Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886/2001), and in his earlier works, has been hailed as a revolutionary turning 
point, at least in philosophical terms. Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics tears 
apart, for example, as lived experiences, assumptions dividing the very corporeality 
of our individual and social being from the systems of knowledge and expectations, 
and of how and where we live from the construction and meaning of our individual 
and collective identities (Woodward, 2013). And yet there are circumstances—
perhaps this is mostly so when living outside an established order from which you 
derive your meaning—that render your status, your future, your security profoundly 
disturbing, with no point of remittance. In such circumstances—and these are the 
circumstances today most obviously of the refugee, the dispossessed, and the poor—
the future is only tenable by being able to belong to whatever established order is 
necessary. Having the requisite skills, appearance, and mode of being to secure a 
job and somewhere to live are not very mysterious but necessary indications that 
being part of any such order has been effected. This paper explores these points in 
relation to an ethnographic study, conducted over one year, of looked after 
children,  focussing on one child in her reception year at her local mainstream 
primary school. More generally, this serves as an illustration of how schools 
necessarily do the work of the symbolic order. 
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Being, Identity, Institution 
Before turning to the empirical and ethnographic aspects of this paper, I should 
make a more general point about the particular theories or kinds of philosophy that 
emerge under the personal pronoun of Nietzsche or Agamben, or anyone else. 
Whilst not wanting to deny any of the specific properties or arguments of any single 
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thinker, it is not any uniqueness, indicating an individual genius or egregious error 
of thinking made by anyone, I wish to discuss and analyse. Instead, I am interested 
in the positions that Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical being occupies in relation 
to what I describe as the established order; where the established order represents a 
vested interest in maintaining whatever that order supports, such as a hierarchy, or a 
set of beliefs, or a series of practices that every day identities are configured and 
more or less secured around.  
What Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical being emphasizes are the 
structural factors, such as cultural practices, political alliances and aims, that 
contribute to the context identities are produced and enacted within; also the 
internal logical operations of the drama of the lives of those involved. It is through 
these structural factors opportunities to encounter Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysical ontology come into being, as described in Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886/2001). But why choose, Beyond Good and Evil? Why not instead, for 
example, indicate The Gay Science (1887/2001) and emphasize that its articulation 
of the death of God is the articulation of the end of any metaphysical 
epistemological truth or ontological necessity; and that what follows from this has 
been a radical philosophical nihilism? And of course, it is true, my choice of 
Beyond Good and Evil is to some extent arbitrary; but at a perhaps more superficial 
level, my very brief description of why I have chosen this text rather than another 
may I hope throw a little light, perhaps a little awkwardly, on some of the more 
liberationist or revolutionary potential that has been claimed on behalf of 
Nietzsche’s work. 
At a superficial level, Beyond Good and Evil (1886/2001) is a bravura 
philosophical performance. In it the epistemological regime of the established 
philosophical order is perceived as being a contingently determined order, forged to 
support its political and ethical vested interests. As Moss (1998) has noted, Foucault 
mobilises the arguments and the abundant energy in this text to indicate a 
Nietzschean exuberance that refuses the ontological determinism and 
epistemological limitations of what by contrast appears to be a pernicious 
philosophical and social landscape. And given, because so vast, the impossible to 
measure outpouring of books, papers, conferences, positions and reputations that 
have similarly emerged, it has become difficult not to see certain philosophers, such 
as Deleuze, Derrida, Nancy and Agamben as short-hand for revolutionary being; as 
being that is representative of those who remain apart, determined to find a place 
having exposed the contingent nature of a metaphysical order that is no longer 
tenable on the grounds that it has claimed all along. At a superficial level, of course, 
this is true. But in order for such truth to become possible, the well-known figures 
that have always already been mentioned, or at least silently acknowledged, such as 
Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and the like, must have long maintained some place, 
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some stable place, not very far away from the established order; and largely it has 
been from there that they have been able to launch their critique of that same 
established system, in many of its political, economic and epistemological 
manifestations. Without the political and intellectual alternative to the established 
order, prised into being by the political and intellectual status of Foucault, Deleuze, 
Derrida and their like, there would be no other place to go. This is not the same as 
saying that the arguments that crop in Beyond Good and Evil (1886/2001) would 
struggle to gain a theoretical purchase within the established order. Instead a more 
basic position is required: unless Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and their like, already 
had a place from which to read and present Beyond Good and Evil, in other words 
unless they belonged to such an institution with a culture of understanding that is 
able to accommodate a different political and theoretical order (including that of 
themselves), then no position of difference to the metaphysical determinism that 
Nietzsche exposes in his work could be maintained. 
If Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida did not have faculties of philosophy, schools 
of humanities, a publishing industry that runs after their names to turn them into 
money and reputations, and the accompanying rest, as well as similar orchestrations 
for other academics and commentators, then there would be no place, no other 
established space from where the end of metaphysics could be articulated, 
perceived and understood. This superficial, but basic and corporeal point is 
stubbornly indelible. For Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and the like to be recognised, 
requires without exception that some other established order that also now includes, 
but in a way that undermines the metaphysical determinism of the previous 
established order, be forged and occupied.  
Without such a place already being there, financially, physically, 
intellectually, and being of another order, which includes, but simultaneously 
undermines, as in the process of erasure, the established order then, well frankly, 
you can have no place, no identity. Most obviously this because no one is able to 
recognize any of your thinking that indicates being is contingently forged rather 
than metaphysically given; what is more no one is able to follow, much less 
comprehend, what you are saying; and thus, you have no place inside the institution, 
no job, no money, no prospects. But in actual fact, by now, you have also endured a 
priori and simultaneously a second destitution. Your identity, as a philosopher, the 
only one that counts in the circumstances, is non-existent, quite obviously, since no 
one can perceive or even register that you are. 
In other words, there is no being, no identity, outside of the institution. And 
perhaps when the institution is philosophy, or a department of philosophy, or even a 
philosophical movement, that’s not so bad. But when the only institution with any 
credibility that you are statistically likely to have any chance of remaining within is 
your local mainstream school; and when not to do so significantly reduces not only 
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your life chances but also the length of your life; then being destituted, twice, by 
society is a horrendous possibility that needs to be avoided.  
If there is a caveat, then, to a Nietzschean revolutionary exuberance it is this: 
whether you call it the established order, the metaphysical order, the Symbolic 
Order, or the other order; onto-epistemic identity, that is—the staging of being—is 
dependent upon some identity or other being recognised and securely stitched—or 
in the currently modish language of Bowlby (1997), attached—to the world in 
which it is securely configured and lent meaning. When this does not happen, or 
goes wrong, then the consequences for those with fewest resources, and so not 
Foucault, not Deleuze, not Derrida, are dreadful. Whatever one might feel about 
current state schooling in the UK: for those children who are most vulnerable—a 
definition which includes looked after children—the local state school is likely to be 
the only institution specifically organized to establish and support their best 
possible future. Especially for those children from challenging socio-economic 
backgrounds, it is likely to be the only such institution that they will ever have the 
chance of belonging to; it is, in some respects, though imperfect, the best chance 
they will ever have. Somehow, they must belong. 
The identities, the lives, and the structural factors in the case I’m addressing 
here, unfold in and around a primary school where I worked as a Teaching Assistant 
for one day a week for just over a year, in order to record the lives of two looked 
after children. This paper concentrates on only one of these children, who was not 
quite five at the start of the academic year, when this paper begins. Looked after 
children are amongst the largest and most vulnerable of identifiable groups within 
the UK who are marginalised according to a normativity that sees them as by 
definition falling outside the institution of the family. This falling outside, which is 
often determined by significant levels of abuse or neglect, can have a prevalent and 
damaging impact throughout a person’s life. Surely if philosophy has anything to 
say worth listening to, it should be about such matters. 
How can it be that Nietzsche’s famous critique of metaphysical truth and 
order, and Agamben’s (1998) analysis of bare life and homo sacer, can have any 
critical purchase, if not explanatory power, in relation to the depressing statistical 
fate of looked after children in the UK? Another much more provocative question 
might be: if Nietzsche’s famous critique of metaphysical truth and order, and 
Agamben’s analysis of bare life and homo sacer, are unable to provide us with any 
significant insight into the mundane realities by which we live, including such 
troubling outcomes as the depressing statistical fate of looked after children; then 
other than facilitating an oppositional philosophical indulgence, saying nothing 
beyond a cliquey academic modishness, what is their point? And whilst this is not 
the place to exhaustively list the extensive discontinuities that exist between the 
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broad outcomes for children who have not been looked after, and those for children 
whose lives become the more direct responsibility of the state, it is important to be 
sure about the extent and nature of these differences, and to whom they apply. 
 
A Looked After Child in The UK: A State of Exception 
Briefly, then, a looked after child in the UK is defined as follows: 
 
Under the Children Act 1989, a child is legally defined as “looked 
after” by a local authority if he or she:  
 
is provided with accommodation for a continuous period for more 
than 24 hours  
is subject to a care order; or  
is subject to a placement order  
 
A looked after child ceases to be looked after when he or she turns 18 
years old. On reaching his or her 18th birthday, the status of the child 
changes from being looked after to being a young adult eligible for 
help and assistance from the local authority (DfE, 2014). 
 
Let us think about this in terms that both Agamben and Nietzsche encourage us to 
understand. We will begin with Agamben, and a theme that is very much alive, 
since it describes a growing rift of increasing political and economic significance. 
This expanding rift intensifies the growing distance between those whose identities 
are invested in what I am going to refer to as the established state; and those whose 
identities lack the same investments, and therefore consequently fall outside the 
established state: by default these are the people who quite simply do not belong. 
We will come back to the established state shortly, but for the moment I sketch 
one of the ways that this concern has been articulated. Giorgio Agamben, among 
many others, has commented on the implications and assumptions that have created 
this increasingly pressing scenario. Most famously Agamben has discussed those 
whose identities fall outside the established state, and, who therefore by default, are 
quite simply those who do not belong, through the figure of “homo sacer,” a figure 
engendered, Agamben explains, by the modern state of exception (Agamben, 1998). 
The state of exception is itself brought into being when the sovereign (perhaps 
taking the form, for example, of the democratically elected President of the United 
States of America; or Colonel Gadaffi when he was in power; or the nominal head, 
but effectively any arrangement that is the determining power, of any household or 
family) suspends the Law (in whatever form that might take, such as some aspect of 
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a written constitution, or a set of ideological principles, or accepted patterns of 
behaviour) that ordinarily gives rights, rights of being by right of belonging and 
identity, to the various subjects that would ordinarily be constituted by that Law of 
the established state. Examples of the state of exception include any executive 
decision that holds in abeyance or strips from being, any rights and practices that 
would otherwise by nature accrue by being a member of the established state, such 
as: the state of exception that functions to permit extraordinary rendition; the state 
of exception that functions to permit the sanctioning of benefits claimants; and the 
state of exception that functions to permit the suspension of habeas corpus. 
But what happens to such bodies, bodies that were once citizens with rights, 
bodies that as such without identities, according to the established state, are 
unrecognizable, as being outside the Law? Testament to the rise in the nature of 
politics ushered in by the increase of states of exception, include: tides of refugees, 
notably from countries where the established state has been replaced for these 
refugees by a state of exception, such as in Syria, Iraq, and Somalia; as, similarly, 
does the rapid emergence of refugee camps and detention centres; as does, in the 
UK, the growth in the number of food banks set up by the third sector for the rising 
number of people that the state, for whatever reason, no longer obliges itself to 
(ethically and economically) regard. These are all easily identifiable examples of 
states of exception. 
 
This “state of exception” produces the figure of homo sacer and the 
condition of “bare life” to which we are all ultimately susceptible. In a 
state of exception, to continue the theme of elision and the sovereign 
suspension of law, the individual is deprived of national civil rights 
and international human rights—such as habeas corpus, appeal to 
systems of legality and, increasingly, recourse to the Geneva 
Convention and due process—and is in turn constituted (interned) 
within a “zone of indistinction” where the dividing line between 
citizen and outlaw, legality and illegality, law and violence, and 
ultimately life and death are strategically and at times fatally blurred 
(Sowah, 2015, p. 5) 
 
 
The figure of homo sacer is profoundly without. Without rights, without power, 
without a place to be institutionally, as the institution for example, of yourself, in 
relation to the established state; because any such identity by definition is not 
recognized by the established state, and is the predominant characteristic of being 
outside the established state. It is not difficult to understand how bearers of this 
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deficit of identity as regarded by the established state, might be represented to us by 
refugees, dissidents, the poor, and that their fate is the embodiment of that which 
falls outside the assumption of the same established order.  
This is also very profoundly a falling outside of the assumption of identity and 
belonging as forms of natural being. Specifically in relation to looked after children, 
this falling outside of the assumption of identity and belonging as forms of natural 
being, would apply to their individual being and the established order of the family, 
and within that to the established order of the community and society. It is this 
falling outside the assumption of identity and belonging as forms of natural being 
which seems to provide a philosophical and political link to certain pathologies that 
are associated with looked after children. These pathologies are often described as 
“attachment disorders” (Chaffin et al., 2006). The pathologies or ‘attachment 
disorders’ from this perspective are especially interesting because they indicate the 
site where the difference between internal being and the external world of the 
established order are forged as identity (Hillen & Wright, 2015). We will look in 
detail at one aspect of this, namely radical water practice, drawn from the 
ethnographic research. Educationally the impact of these pathologies is devastating:  
 
 
There is now a difference of 42.7 percentage points between the rates 
of looked after and non-looked after children achieving A*-C 
GCSEs in English and mathematics and also the same size gap for 
5+ A*-C GCSEs and equivalents including English and 
mathematics. 
Looked after children are twice as likely to be permanently excluded 
from school and three times more likely to have a fixed term 
exclusion than all other children  
67.8 per cent of looked after children had a special educational need 
(SEN)  
The most common type of SEN for looked after children, was 
“behavioural, emotional and social difficulties.”  
There has been a general improvement in the percentage of looked 
after children with a SEN attaining most key stage 2 and key stage 
4 measures  
The percentage of looked after children with a SEN achieving key 
stage 2 and key stage 4 measures is much lower than looked after 
children without a SEN. For some measures the difference is 
greater than double.  
SFR 50/2013 DfE (December, 2013) 





But entrenched poor outcomes for looked after children are far from confined to 
significantly depressed levels of educational attainment. For example, the Royal 
Colleges of Nursing, Paediatrics and Child Health, and General Practitioners in an 
inter-collegial publication (2012) noted: 
 
Although looked after children and young people have many of the 
same health risks and problems as peers, the extent is often 
exacerbated due to their experiences of poverty, abuse and neglect. 
For example in respect of mental health and emotional well-being, 
looked after children show significantly higher rates of mental health 
disorders than others (45%, rising to 72% for those in residential care, 
compared to 10% of the general population aged 5 to 15)—conduct 
disorders being the most prevalent, with others having emotional 
disorders (anxiety and depression) or hyperactivity. Eleven percent are 
reported to be on the autism spectrum and many others have 
developmental problems. Two thirds of looked after children have 
been found to have at least one physical health complaint, such as 
speech and language problems, bedwetting, co-ordination difficulties 
and eye or sight problems. Generally the health and well-being of 
young people leaving care has consistently been found to be poorer 
than that of young people who have never been in care, with higher 
levels of teenage pregnancy, drug and alcohol abuse clearly evident 
(Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health, 2012). 
 
Radical Water Practice 
I would like now to turn explicitly to observations derived from an ethnographic 
study of looked after children, as mentioned earlier. The study spanned just over a 
year, and for the purposes of this paper will focus on only one child, Mel, (a 
pseudonym is being used here in compliance with the ethical protocols according to 
which this research was conducted) and her time within the reception class of her 
local mainstream primary school. The data was gathered by myself, as a researcher, 
working within Mel’s classroom as a Teaching Assistant, once a week. Within the 
space of a year, Mel’s “compulsion,” or “obsession,” or “fixation,” as some of her 
behaviours were variously characterised, with water, had changed. Up until this 
point, what Mel did with water, her interest in it, her practice of being with water 
had precipitated her abjection from being within the regular classroom; but from the 
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age of around five this became an interest that could be accommodated, as being 
within a part of a regular classroom. Admittedly this place of accommodation was 
only just within the margins of a regular classroom; but still, it was somewhere, 
some space, that could be included.  
Being included, and an identity that can take place, as has already been 
discussed, is an empirically essential prerequisite to the possibility of any sustained 
and hospitable experience. Prior to this, Mel’s way of experiencing water had the 
effect of removing her, taking her away from the behaviours, meanings and 
reactions that could be tolerated as being part of a regular classroom. It is easier to 
understand why this was so by looking at a brief list of some of Mel’s previous 
water practices. Mel would: stand in a pan in the girls’ toilets whilst flushing the 
cistern over and over again, so that water cascaded down her lower body and onto 
the floor; switch on taps so that water overflowed basins; pour water over and 
across herself; transfer water in various quantities from one place to another, and 
sometimes more importantly transfer it to places where water was not supposed to 
be.  
All of these practices, based around water, required Mel, either: to make a bolt 
for some region of the classroom that was not effectively policed; or, more 
surreptitiously to absent herself from an area of detection. If she was going to 
maintain her water focussed activity, which she was described as being 
“compulsive” about, or “obsessed” with, or “fixated” on, then these were the only 
alternatives available. It is interesting to describe the terrain that this logic of radical 
water practice mapped out in the classroom within which Mel was situated. It was a 
terrain composed of only the most meagre of possibilities for being. These 
slenderest of chances, to be in this way, existed only in the least well policed areas 
of the classroom; and these were barely spaces at all; certainly they were not spaces 
in themselves, since they were at best relational, like the gap between an 
incompletely drawn curtain and an open cupboard door; and were therefore also 
dependent upon perspective, such as the direction in which a teacher was gazing, so 
that in their nature they were thoroughly transitory; thus their being hung upon a 
brief concatenation of circumstances, momentary events that obscured the presence 
of a body, which, in snatched seconds and at most minutes, could not be seen, and 
so briefly allowed Mel’s radical water practice to be.  
It was as if there were two competing horizons of being; horizons of 
possibility that were very real, but had to be brought into existence through some 
form of activity, a process which it is now common to call a practice, and to 
describe the someone or something involved in this as a practitioner. In one sense, 
then, it would seem that the classroom represented two potentialities, two mutually 
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exclusive ways of being, neither of which could be there, let alone be sustained for 
any period of time on their own.  
The horizon of being that supported Mel’s radical water practice to be realized 
required chance to bring into play collisions of arrays of circumstances, a teacher’s 
attention distracted through a question spoken by another child, a curtain drawn in 
happenstance conspiracy with a partially closed door, providing the cover needed to 
run across and secretly turn on a tap; there being precisely no metaphysical 
guarantee to either the regular order of the classroom, nor even of success for Mel 
in her demonstration that this very same classroom order could not be so 
metaphysically guaranteed. Was Mel able to capitalise on the opportunity of 
secretly turning on of that tap?, would it lead to the subsequent flooding of a corner 
of the classroom?, and to that end, might the curtain remain drawn and the door 
open long enough?, could the teacher be distracted sufficiently?, was it possible for 
Mel to manage this whole ensemble discretely enough…? Even linguistically, as 
reflected for example by the modal verbs, “could,” “would,” “might,” and in the 
conditional sense of the tenses, including, “was it possible for Mel to manage this 
whole ensemble discretely enough…?,” the scene is represented as one of emerging 
and receding possibilities that open up at various sites within the field of the 
classroom.  
This occurs, of course, from Mel’s perspective vis a vis the realization of her 
water practice; which is to say, that from the place of Mel’s gaze—which cannot 
remain the same, nor be static and so must alter—every now and then, there is 
perceived somewhere along the wall of regular classroom practice a potential 
breach; a potential breach that is contingent upon opportunities delivered by chance; 
that may or may not be exploitable; and therefore that may or may not serve as a 
temporary platform upon which to stage a flood, or fountain, or water fall, or 
shower. Though when such a staging is successfully realized, it has the effect of 
displacing, even though relatively briefly, the regular practice of being in the 
classroom, which has to stop, in order for Mel’s radical water practice to be. Quite 
literally what appeared to be happening was that in order for Mel’s being to be 
staged, which occurred through her water practice, the regular classroom had to be 
disordered, displaced, made somewhere other. But then, quite quickly, this staging 
of being Mel, would be dismantled, the temporary breach in the wall of regular 
classroom order would be sealed over, and the terrain, upon which the radical 
expression of Mel’s being was based, would be removed. Nevertheless, what each 
staging of being Mel through her radical water practice demonstrated, with a 
salience that was deadly regardless of its brevity, was that the regular order of the 
classroom was not a metaphysical given.  
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Any metaphysical truth is such because it has to be such, and can therefore be 
no other. From time to time Mel was very literally told to think directly, without 
distraction, about the importance of acting as if the regular order of the classroom 
were a metaphysical truth, and that there could be no other form of being within that 
space. This happened when Mel was sent to the thinking cushion, where she was 
dispatched to think about how she had made the wrong choices, such as deciding to 
saturate soft toys by putting them in the water bath or flooding the cloakroom, 
which would momentarily have disrupted or even stopped regular classroom 
activity. What Mel was repeatedly directed to contemplate whilst seated alone in 
this way was: that any register of the metaphysical given of this and therefore any 
regular classroom was palpably the school’s desire that it be so, rather than it 
actually being so; that the course of this same desire could be interrupted, even if 
only momentarily, and when this happened, it exposed something of monumental 
importance; it exposed the irresolvable problem that the regular classroom was not 
what it desired itself to be, namely a metaphysical reality; and that this exposure, of 
itself to itself, that it was not itself, was massively troubling; because it meant that 
any certainty, based upon what should be most certain of all, namely itself, could 
always be deluded; thus no guarantee of Being existed, no metaphysical order was 
able to rescue this situation; and in reaction to which the regular classroom exacted 
a political reality in lieu of its metaphysical guarantee, that it would forge itself as 
resolutely as it could be from its own practice of regular classroom activity. 
To understand why the implications of Mel’s radical water practice were so 
devastating, it helps if we see that what she did to the regular classroom, is 
analogous to how Lacan’s clinical and theoretical research exposes the implacable 
terror of the Real and the alarming fragility of the Symbolic Order. As Belau (2001) 
has noted, the accession of the subject, which in this case is Mel, to the Symbolic 
Order—represented here for Mel at school as being in the regular classroom—can 
be a deeply traumatic experience. As we have seen, being in the regular classroom 
is far from a simple matter of being physically embedded within the contours of 
some specific area called a school. Being in any such place, we have observed, is a 
practice, and not a metaphysical given. And because being is a practice we have 
also seen that when Mel does not engage in this way, she is dislocated from and 
dislocates regular classroom activity. Indeed, the activity of being in the regular 
classroom, and of being anywhere, requires more than a neutral engagement. Being 
in the regular classroom necessitates that its subjects’ being is defined by the same 
consistency that makes it possible to identify that area as such; being in the regular 
classroom, in whatever form that takes, rich or poor, looked after by the state or by 
biological parents, is divided up, directed, modulated and is even forged, out of the 
way that the regular classroom organizes the being of its subjects.  
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What Mel’s radical water practice illustrates is that: being in a particular place 
means that you become by making up a contour of that same region, and that 
without such contours, the specific being in some place that you form as an 
individual, would not be realized. The example of “phonics,” which I shall shortly 
come to, rehearses very deliberately every day the same ontological principle. This 
is the principle of being as being staged, rather than being as being always already 
there. And yet, for this staging of being to have any meaning, what is not, and 
according to this same logic, could not possibly ever be staged is its very 
“stagedness.”  
Any disclosure that whatever was specifically being presented was not that 
being itself, but instead was radically differently never always already there, and 
could only ever be anywhere through the practice of being presented, would 
mortally contradict any particle of any such ontological plausibility. This would 
make even the fiction of being there prior to staging, an act of being that was from 
the moment of its very possibility unsustainable. Quite literally in its stead what 
must be staged is that being is always already there and therefore could not be 
staged. And in this “staging moment” of being, that this could not be staged is more 
than an injunction against the possibility that any being could be if staged; it is more 
generally a symptom of the desire to be independently, but also the systematic 
working out of this impossibility, which the injunction of not is simultaneously 
driven to silence.  
We have already seen that Mel’s radical water practice has challenged the 
injunction that protects the obviously staged nature of Being in the classroom; and 
that it has been through the process of this challenge that an alternative form of 
being Mel has intermittently emerged through the wall of symbolic classroom 
practice. This is because all ontological plausibility is dependent upon that same 
determination not to hear, not to see, not to acknowledge and thereby register the 
contingent nature of all identity. The same conditions that are therefore necessary to 
assert the independent Being/being of Mel, which have the effect of configuring her 
being outside established classroom practice also apply. And just to remind 
ourselves, when Mel forgets or does not comply with how this convention works, 
and by this means effectively disrupts the assumption of normal classroom 
ontology, she is sent to the thinking mat to contemplate the ramifications of this 
intolerable form of exposing its metaphysical fragility to the Real.  
So how does phonics manage to reinforce and suture its participants to the 
Symbolic Order of classroom ontology, and shape the definition of those 
participants into the contours of that space, so that they are integral to its being 




Phonics, Identity, Belonging 
Much attention has been paid to the issue of phonics in classrooms, but virtually 
entirely from the perspective of it being or not being an essential aspect of English 
literacy that must be acquired as a normal part of one’s understanding of the world, 
if children are to become literate. The driving motivation behind this compulsory 
practice in state schools is to establish a national identity with respect to the 
standardized achievement of literacy in England. It is perhaps more obvious at this 
scale that all projects that express identity are political projects, in as much as they 
assert what or who belongs according to specific criteria that are invested with some 
property that is supposed to represent authenticity and belonging, or otherwise 
impropriety and exile.  
There are a number of areas of contention that emerge from this sort of 
perspective about “phonics,” which tend to appear to be empirical in their nature. 
For example: Are the grapheme and phoneme relations that phonics describe 
accurate? Do children naturally acquire competence in language and literacy 
according to the highly prescriptive order of acquisition that phonics maintains? Is 
the evidence about rates of literacy learning demonstrably improved using phonics 
rather than any other method? Does the prescriptive structure of phonics constrict 
understanding, learning and teaching to a brief set of instrumental techniques that 
limit creative thought, independence and engagement with reading and education 
generally?  
Whilst these are obviously interesting questions, mostly because of what they 
indicate about assumptions of how people understand and are oriented towards the 
world that they encounter; even before they have been answered, if indeed any 
empirically plausible answers are at all possible, all of these questions take as their 
fundamentally credible and fascinating assumption that it is technical expertise or 
even exposure to a certain kind of correct analysis, that will lead to the development 
of literacy because of its obvious relevance as a defining feature of belonging to the 
educated state of the nation. This last point is very far from an exaggeration: it is the 
motivating reason for phonics.  
Phonics is thus the inclusive medium by which the British government seeks 
to make every child by this practice belong as an integral part of the nation in the 
form of its continuous learning community; and this desire is managed through the 
state’s compulsion to make all state educated children perform the right physical 
action with their body, to accompany their utterance of the correct sound, with this 
articulation demanded by every child on their visual receipt of the corresponding 
letter shapes. Whilst, for the most part, extraordinarily efficient, in terms of 
performing being a part of this community, this determination to perform belonging 
does come at a brutal cost. It is, of course, a metaphysical cost. Moreover, it 
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necessitates assumption and invasion; and then the persistent vigilance of guarding, 
and knowing as a possibility, which is all the more disturbing, that no metaphysical 
being is possible. And why? 
Well, first of all, let us try to rehearse here, however imperfectly, how 
phonics is routinely practiced. Where and when phonics happens, how it is situated, 
is very significant; and for Mel it is situated thus, between “carpet time” and 
assembly, to maximum affect. When children first arrive at school, from around 
eight forty-five in the morning, accompanied by parents or older siblings, they 
begin “free play.” Free play as a child involves taking part, with other people or on 
you own, in either one or more of the following types of options of being: standing, 
leaning or even sitting about, apparently dazed whilst the rest of the world zips 
around your relatively inert presence; playing with other children, usually by 
employing equipment of some kind, such as a hoop, sand, or some educational 
resource, but always inevitably in the space provided by the school which shapes 
what being is possible; participating in a more obvious engagement with traditional 
if not stereotypical school activities, such as looking at books, constructing things 
with physical materials, and creating a visible impression of something that is 
represented by drawing, writing or colouring.  
Free play therefore functions as an introduction to the Symbolic Order of the 
school, during which the threshold is crossed to the more formal world of cultural, 
social, intellectual and economic identity where this is all quite literally performed 
or played out. There are symbolic and practical markers indicating the manageable 
nature of this transition which help to define the ontological shape of free play; and 
these include: parents and older siblings milling around in the classroom area, 
saying goodbye (thus signalling the gentle affirmation of the immanent termination 
of the world oriented towards my being, and the opening up of the horizon of the 
external world which manifests the requirement of an impersonal being and the 
practice of its formal presence, for example by sitting up straight, listening properly, 
not speaking out of turn, keeping your hands and feet to yourself and a thousand 
other injunctions and conjunctions that are overtly registered in wall displays, and 
notices written on boards, or are manifested by being into verse in order to be 
chanted, overt markers and covert markers that exist in all sorts of learned 
behaviours, they all invade, shape and define your being, which they incant, suture 
and articulate in the Symbolic Order); mums and dads, and brothers and sisters 
sitting with or bending over this vulnerable extension of who they are, assisting in 
some way, by undoing the zip or buttons on a coat, finding a note in a book-bag that 
has to be passed to the teacher (confirming that this movement from the practice of 
personal to impersonal being is acknowledged and anticipated by the bulwarks of 
your personal being); and more fundamentally by the nature of the activities that 
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free play generates and supports (which are not overtly directed by “staff,” the alien 
representatives of your impersonal being, unlike the activities that will soon follow 
until you are allowed to return to the world of personal being).  
These and other markers acknowledge and so legitimate what then seems to 
be the compulsion to be part of an inexorable movement along the road to the world 
of the impersonal Symbolic Order; they manage this locomotion; they allow these 
and other symbols of personal being to be brought right up to the brink of 
impersonal being, which, because of this gesture towards their illusory 
accommodation, offer some reassurance, just prior to crossing that decisive 
threshold: this is reassurance brought about by the assumption of common purpose. 
That accommodation of personal being is a reality after free play is an 
illusion is remorselessly demonstrated throughout the day, with toys that have been 
taken across this line from home being confiscated and suspended out of bounds in 
limbo, in net bags that allow the contraband to be seen in plain view but hang high 
out of reach, until the end of the day when the impersonal Symbolic Order 
temporarily withdraws. But there are other persistent demonstrations that personal 
being is outlawed, is outcast, such as the injunction against wearing personal 
clothing with the compulsion of a school uniform; the determination of the day’s 
timetable with its consequent evocation of its subjects’ sentimental and intellectual 
concerns and identities, which simultaneously provokes its disciplinary abjection of 
personal being from the presence of the school and classroom, in a thousand details 
that define legitimate being, such as not running along the corridors, eating what, 
when and how as directed, even thinking is prescribed so that it becomes a 
performative activity that privileges correct orientation towards the impersonal 
order of being, since thought should be on task, useful and communicated in the 
proper way through the raising of a hand and then waiting to receive direction as to 
whether to articulate any thoughts in the specified manner or as to remain silent. 
Carpet time follows free play, and is symbolically the moment when all 
representations of personal being, such as parents and siblings, certain kinds of 
conversation, toys and other artefacts, redolent of the symbolic home and the 
internality of personhood, are removed from the affective presence of the 
classroom; even coats that once bore the imprint of “home” are now rebranded as 
“outdoor wear” with their relocation to a specific area of the school that emphasises 
their functional role within the impersonal Symbolic Order of the institution, where 
they are put on named pegs in orderly rank outside the classroom, to maximise the 
efficiency of the school educational process in all of its integrated manifestations, 
including being quickly able to locate and put on in a safe place coats, hats, scarves, 
gloves when the weather makes this appropriate. 
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Carpet time affirms the collective impersonal identity of each of the 
participants, adults and children alike, though clearly they fulfil different roles 
within the same essential process. The teacher sits on a low comfortable chair, the 
kind that you see in the reception areas of hotels, garages, businesses; it is obviously 
from an office catalogue of some kind, with its tubular steel frame and chunky, 
rough wool-style oatmeal upholstery, which murmurs, but quite clearly enough, the 
message that the corporation to which it belongs is able to differentiate between and 
then include two levels of being which it has managed to integrate to the same 
common impersonal purpose, and these two levels of being are: being as it is 
practiced by the ordinary, functional equipment (such as the very durable and 
purpose manufactured small plastic seat and metal frame chairs that feel common to 
every state primary classroom in England) that symbolises nothing more beyond 
that which is incidental to this form of being; but then they also practice a less 
obviously industrial but no less instrumental form of ontology which is still clearly 
distinct from that assumed in the practice of the personal Symbolic Order, but 
nevertheless beckons towards a corporate version of personal ontology, a mime of 
the ontology that the individual recognizes as indicating this possibility, of 
something private, mitigating, self-interested; though this is quite obviously the 
institution’s version of personhood and the individualism that it evokes, since it 
simply functions to make the institution more effective according to whatever 
criteria have been ascribed to it.  
But nevertheless, even recognising this last fact, means that the individual 
subject, who has recognised it, also must recognise as a precondition of any such 
understanding, and thereby will be interested in, the division between what is 
marked here as the institution of the school and what is left over from this 
experience, the remainder, the personal that is not completely represented by this 
designation, which is the unintended and the detritus of impersonal Symbolic Order. 
So what the institution establishes by this and other means, and by abjecting or 
ignoring, which amounts to the same thing, the bits of unintended and detritus 
material in whatever form this might take, is an institutional personhood, which it 
installs and reaffirms as the individuals that make up its population of the school. 
We can see evidence of this in almost all of the school’s practices that focus 
on children as if they are individuals in their own right but as in relation to the 
school; as for example in daily assembly, where the school in various ways 
inscribes its values, such as its value for orderliness, with its lining up before 
arriving, and sitting in rows on arrival, and with its respect for all who accede to 
institutional personhood and form the learning community that the school 
represents, marked for instance by the response it engenders in all its individual 
participants collectively to morning salutations, which is simply one polite 
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manifestation of what is nothing less than the school’s ubiquitous moral if not 
spiritual order; or in its practice of instructions, which is possible only because the 
school has managed to forge the institutional personhood of its individual 
participants as instructable beings, reaffirming this constantly, by for example the 
incessant encouragements to listen carefully, sit up properly, think creatively, 
respect other people’s opinions, encouragements and directions which are all the 
time realised in the words spoken by the staff, and written on walls, are sung in 
classrooms, and are praised with stickers and stars displayed in books and on 
posters: they are inescapable.  
And it is with this institutional personhood that children are expected to  
experience and be within the horizon of possibility offered by the school. The logic 
of this process is thoroughly inclusive, in a remarkably and frustratingly Hegelian 
sense, meaning that with respect to it, escape is politically impossible; so that even 
being that is judged by the institution to be a falling away from the being of 
institutional personhood is made evident by the school not of its own contingent 
rather than metaphysical reality; but the perceived degree by which insitutional 
personhood does not occur, instead becomes another instrumental feature for 
creating a hierarchy within which a register of being falls ‘naturally’ and urgently 
into place, with constant reference made to its lists of progression towards being a 
member that properly belongs to the institutional personhood of its individual 
participants, where institutional personhood is given meaning and so can be 
understood.  
This institutional behaviour is essential, since it enables levels of non-
compliance with being in this way to be ordered and addressed as another 
manifestation of the school’s determinedly inclusive property of its ontological 
makeup. Again whilst this might seem to be an abstract expression of day-to-day 
experience, it is rendered real and pervasive by techniques so routine as to become 
the mundane and fundamental practices that define a state primary school. For 
example, there is an endless cycle of established and predictable public 
announcements, that take place in the school within their own routine theatrical 
context, such as during assembly or in registration, that reaffirm, by their 
declarations and markings of achievements and excellence, the consistent practice 
of the school’s onto-epistemic identity.  
They do this, of course, very logically if not altogether tautologically, by 
locating its highest virtues in the events that emerge from its routine and mundane 
existence. Thus there is an endless litany of “readers of the week,” and 
“mathematicians of the week,” declared to the school each Monday morning as it 
gathers collectively throughout the year; since in an almost Tibetan Buddhist 
manner, wherein if an elaborate cosmological map of the Tibetan universe is not 
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completed in sand, and then obliterated, and then the process repeated again, 
endlessly, the ontological order that the map represents would be undone and fall 
into chaos, so that an inextricable tie exists between the Buddhist practice of 
making the map and the ontological order that the map represents; so too, each 
Monday morning, with the announcements of “readers of the week” and 
“mathematicians of the week,” the same process of everyday practice defines the 
ground on which the school is established.  
It is not enough that the practice occurs privately, personally, outside the 
impersonal determination of institutional personal being. It is not enough that in 
some personal space, usually described in terms of an interiority, outside 
institutional being, that practice might be registered and become meaningful in 
some way that is entirely idiosyncratic according to the dimensions and contours of 
what just such a space, an “interiority,” for the school might be. This is almost 
entirely without educational institutional significance. This is not to say of course, 
that, for example, all mathematics that occurs with respect to a child who attends a 
school is useless if that mathematics does not more or less directly emanate from or 
report back to that school: there may be many diverse, important mathematical 
qualities that are explored and developed alternatively. But this is a different kind of 
usefulness. All that matters to the school is that its subjects institutionally comply 
with its educational regime.  
The school must guarantee that no other form of being is tolerated, as far as 
the onto-epistemic identity of the school is concerned, given the school’s 
overwhelming desire that this identity be metaphysical, even though any such 
identity is demonstrably contingent upon the public affirmation of what it is. What 
this amounts to is very unlike the public message that the school celebrates, of 
inclusion, so that even mention of exclusionary possibility as part of the state 
school’s work is prohibited. Prohibition, briefly, is publicly, however, very 
effectively mandated; but only on the grounds that certain forms of ontology 
exclude or compromise some aspect or other of the inclusive practices and beliefs 
that the school maintains: certain kinds of Islam for example are famously 
impermissible in the UK in state schools on these grounds. It is worth mentioning 
this example in particular, because state education, amongst other things, is that for 
which the government of Britain exists, in a ferociously competitive form, only in 
order to maintain and develop as a practice that which accords with its own 
imaginary identity.  
It is this connection, played out in a specific way here, but generally applicable 
in all other contexts, of imaginary identity realised through institutional practice 
(where institutional practice includes not only the way that schools work, but also 
the institutional practices that articulate individual responses to almost anything 
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imaginable, such as not being able to acquire food, or the declaration of the total 
shopping bill by a checkout operator in a supermarket: almost nothing escapes), that 
makes all identity political.  
But what has this to do with events in school, such as “mathematician of the 
week” and “reader of the week”? The philosophical role of truth and the logical 
notion of tautology are central to understanding what happens and what is of 
importance here. These are not simply abstract ideas; they are mechanisms, or 
systems, or processes, or whatever you want to call them, that truth and tautology, 
as structuring affects, have on how we are able to understand the world around us; 
they shape the contours that make up that world and us as individuals, they forge 
the geography by which how we also fit into that landscape and—with some of us 
almost seamlessly and continuously, but others more awkwardly, more 
discontinuously—become a part of its topography; so that in every practical and 
theoretical aspect of our being, they are inescapable and specific. And it would 
appear ludicrous, irrational, unreasonable, unaccountable, if this were not so: 
because the philosophical role of truth, and the logical notion of tautology, are the 
mechanisms, or systems, or processes, or whatever you want to call them, by which 
reason and meaning are able to make their appearance as being—and not as a 
practice—metaphysically within the world. 
That this form of being is forged, and that it can be undone, is not in question.  
Nor is it in doubt that, ontologically, this is the only game in town. The real 
questions, the political questions, are what we do to make this a meaningful 
accommodation, for those whose experiences tell them otherwise; which is not an 
inconsiderable achievement, as, for example, occurred for Mel, as I have tried to 
indicate, above.  
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